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ABSTRACT
With the expansion of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) across critical and regulated industries, systems 
must be continuously updated to remain resilient. At the same time, they should be extremely secure 
and safe to operate and use. The DevOps approach caters to business demands of more speed and 
smartness in production, but it is extremely challenging to implement DevOps due to the complexity 
of critical CPSs and requirements from regulatory authorities. In this study, expert opinions from 33 
European companies expose the gap in the current state of practice on DevOps-oriented continuous 
development and maintenance. The study contributes to research and practice by identifying a set 
of needs. Subsequently, the authors propose a novel approach called Secure DevOps and provide 
several avenues for further research and development in this area. The study shows that, because 
security is a cross-cutting property in complex CPSs, its proficient management requires system-wide 
competencies and capabilities across the CPSs development and operation.
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1. INTRodUCTIoN
In recent years, with the emergence of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), societies have become 
interconnected (Müller, 2017). This increased connectivity is associated with greater concerns 
related to various quality attributes, such as safety and security. The incidents and risks of operating 
CPSs are essential nowadays due to the expansion of CPSs across critical and regulated industry 
sectors such as energy, aerospace, automotive, and healthcare, where even minor failures may lead 
to devastating human and financial loss. Therefore, higher levels of security and reliability must be 
achieved in developing CPSs, and these systems must also stay continuously updated to remain resilient 
in operation, especially during critical events such as cyber-attacks (Yasar & Kontostathis, 2016).
At the same time, production organizations in critical and regulated domains, e.g., automotive, 
aerospace, and healthcare express an increasing interest in utilizing the DevOps approach for 
developing and maintaining consumer CPSs (e.g., wearables, virtual reality), as it enables them to 
shorten time-to-market and be more responsive to operational demands of customers and the market 
in general (Foehr et al., 2017; Stirbu & Mikkonen, 2010). However, adopting DevOps in industrial 
domains is extremely challenging due to the complexity of critical CPSs and the devastating costs 
associated with their downtime, as well as strict requirements demanded by regulatory authorities 
within those domains (Giaimo, Yin, Berger, & Crnkovic, 2016; Törngren & Sellgren, 2018, Morales, 
Yasar & Volkmann, 2018). Therefore, there is an increasing need for novel solutions and technologies 
enabling organizations to benefit from DevOps and, at the same time, maintain the required high 
levels of security and reliability in critical CPSs.
The objective of our study was to obtain a better understanding of what these novel solutions and 
technologies entail. To this end, a set of research questions were formulated as below:
RQ1: What are the needs of critical and regulated industries for integrating security into DevOps?
RQ2: What are the benefits and characteristics of such systematic integration expected by these industries?
RQ3: What is the impact of such systematic integration on the company’s business?
To answer the research questions, we conducted a qualitative survey of 33 companies active 
in a variety of critical and regulated industrial sectors to explore the gap in the state-of-practice 
on DevOps-oriented continuous development and maintenance of CPSs. As such, we make 
three contributions to research and practice. First, we provide an empirical insight into a set of 
key needs of and expected benefits from implementing DevOps while complying with required 
security standards in CPSs development and deployment, as well as the business impacts that it 
can produce on the implementing companies. Second, based on these identified needs, benefits 
and impacts, we envisioned a new approach, called Secure DevOps, which encompasses human 
factors, tools, technologies and processes for adopting DevOps integrated with security across 
industrial domains. Finally, we propose three main areas which deserve future scientific research 
as well as further development in practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of literature 
related to CPSs and security in critical and regulated industries, and DevOps in such a context. The 
research methodology is explained in Section 3, and the findings are reported in Section 4. In Section 
5, we present the envisioned Secure DevOps approach based on the findings of the study. Section 6 
concludes the paper with highlights for future work.
2. LITeRATURe ReVIew
2.1. CPSs in Critical and Regulated Industries
CPSs have been defined as the integration of calculation and physical processes, which involves 
embedded computers and networks monitoring and controlling the physical processes (Lee, 2007). 
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As an emerging research area with the overlapping and integration of multiple fields of science 
and engineering, CPSs require software and system engineers, computer scientists, and network 
professionals to collaborate closely with experts in various fields such as automation and control, 
civil engineering, mechanical engineering, and biology.
The generic architecture of an Internet of Things (IoT) system proposed largely defines the 
elements of modern CPSs (Taivalsaari & Mikkonen, 2017), including 1) client devices; 2) gateways; 
3) backend cloud, including databases and other storage systems; 4) analysis applications; and 5) 
end-user applications. All of these elements rely on computers and computing. Additionally, in many 
setups, they can all be safety-critical for various reasons. Furthermore, CPSs built for critical and 
regulated domains such as healthcare, aerospace and automotive have additional complexities and 
strict requirements (Khaitan & McCalley, 2015, Morales, Yasar & Volkmann, 2018). CPSs in such 
domains often rely on thousands of live sensors and field devices that must be functional and constantly 
monitored to control physical systems. However, since these systems are distributed rather than 
centralized in nature, monitoring, diagnosing, and analyzing these systems becomes more challenging. 
Finally, failure of critical CPSs are associated with significantly high costs and may, in some cases, 
be lethal to human beings or even lead to global catastrophes. Therefore, the construction of critical 
CPSs is often subject to strict certification, which is time-consuming and requires formal software 
development processes. For instance, the European Space Agency requires software companies to 
comply with standards such as ECSS-E-40 and ECSS-Q-80.
To set baseline requirements associated with quality, standardization organizations, such as 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), have created standards that describe the 
processes and requirements for developing software in such a manner that regulatory authorities will 
accept the product to the markets. By proving compliance with these standards, a company can show 
to the authorities that the software has been developed with a process that ensures safety and security
2.2. Security in CPSs
Securing CPSs against malicious attacks is of utmost importance, as otherwise, malfunctioning and 
insecure CPSs can cause enormous damage to individuals, businesses, nations, and the humankind. 
With the growing importance of CPSs in our daily operations, concerns regarding their security and 
resiliency have also been raised (Yasar & Kontostathis, 2016). Due to their complexity and inter-
connectivity, the new generation of CPSs have to deal with new vulnerabilities and threats (Diaz. 
& Muñoz, 2020), which makes these systems more susceptible to attacks. A framework proposed 
represents CPSs security from a three-dimensional perspective (Humayed, Lin, Li, & Luo, 2017):
1.  The security perspective considering well-known taxonomies of threats, vulnerabilities, attacks, 
and controls;
2.  The CPSs components perspective considering cyber, cyber-physical, and physical 
components; and
3.  The CPSs systems perspective, including general CPSs features and representative systems, such 
as smart grids and smart cars.
In addition to address core security principles such as confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(Merkow & Raghavan, 2010), other security concerns must also be considered in the context of 
CPSs, including resilience to attacks (Merkow & Raghavan, 2010, Yasar & Kontostathis, 2016), data 
authentication (Merkow & Raghavan, 2010; Duc, Jabangwe, Paul, & Abrahamsson, 2017), access 
control (Merkow & Raghavan, 2010), client privacy (Merkow & Raghavan, 2010; Duc et al., 2017, 
Henkel, 2017), multiple layers of security (Suo, Wan, Zou, & Liu, 2012), certifiability (Farroha & 
Farroha, 2014), the influence of humans on the maintenance and operating security-related aspects of 
CPSs (Duc et al., 2017), and integrating security into system development lifecycle as well as when 
it is deployed and becomes operational (Merkow & Raghavan, 2010).
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Previous research on CPSs security mainly focuses on threat detection and prevention, attack 
modeling, trust management, and detection and assessments of faults and vulnerabilities, while 
proposing various security controls for protecting the new generation of CPSs (Khaitan & McCalley, 
2015). However, there is a lack of systematic research on security in CPSs (Humayed et al., 2017), 
especially from a software engineering perspective which plays a key role in CPSs implementation. 
Novel approaches are needed to leverage modern methods, such as DevOps, in developing secure 
and resilient CPSs that comply with regulatory requirements (Laukkarinen, Kuusinen, & Mikkonen, 
2017, Yasar & Kontostathis, 2016). However, potential security issues to be exacerbated by using 
such approaches must be taken into consideration and dealt with appropriately.
2.3. devops and CPSs
Due to regulatory requirements, the development of CPSs in critical domains has typically suffered 
from long development life-cycles. A common misconception is that regulated software development 
needs waterfall-like development where phases follow each other in a strict order, and no agile 
approach is applicable. However, this claim is questionable when agile approaches are tailored to fit 
regulation needs (Cawley, Wang, & Richardson, 2010, Leppänen, Rindell & Hyrynsalmi, S., 2018, 
Mohan & Othmane, 2016).
The term DevOps emerged a decade ago as an amalgamation of Development and Operations 
(Virmani, 2015). It was a reaction to a perceived disconnect between developers and operators within 
the same organization and has been particularly highlighted in later years in companies that develop 
and operate software solutions in the cloud (Jaatun, Cruzes, & Luna, 2017, Mohan & Othmane, 2016).
DevOps is closely related to the concept of continuous delivery and deployment, and virtualized 
infrastructure enables infrastructure as code, where major parts of the deployment and configuration 
effort are done using pre-configured scripts (Düllmann, Paule & v. Hoorn, 2018). This allows 
organizations employing the DevOps paradigm to deploy new versions several times a day. The other 
part of the equation, the operations, is configured to provide feedback from daily operations, which 
in turn supports the development and deployment of new and enhanced features at a rapid pace.
However, the increased speed could easily come at the expense of security. The quick turnaround 
expected in DevOps makes it difficult to enforce security gates and testing regimes that are part of 
many Secure Software Development Lifecycles (S-SDLCs). In the context of regulated development, 
such as IEC 62304 (Medical device software life cycle processes) and IEC 82304 (Health software 
product safety), these gates are an essential requirement for any system. On one hand, DevOps 
practices make it easier to fix security flaws when they are discovered, since there is essentially no 
difference between a security patch and any other deployment. In the DevOps approach, security 
has generally been under the umbrella of operations. However, security must be prioritized as a key 
concern throughout the development process and even after deployment (Merkow & Raghavan, 2010). 
Therefore, to integrate security and improve DevOps, it is essential to perform security tests as a 
part of the automated test that applies to all software. On the other hand, continuous monitoring is 
necessary for identifying security vulnerabilities and breaches and addressing them rapidly (Farroha 
& Farroha, 2014, Mohan & Othmane, 2016).
3. ReSeARCH MeTHodoLoGy
A qualitative survey (Robson, 2011) approach was deemed suitable to answer our three research 
questions, which aimed at exploring the perceptions of companies operating in critical and regulated 
domains on applying DevOps while addressing security concerns. A qualitative survey allows multiple 
levels of analysis (Jansen, 2010) and is widely used in the Software Engineering research community 
(Andersson & Runeson, 2002; Ayala et al., 2018).
The qualitative questionnaire was designed that reflected the three main research questions, 
i.e., RQ1-3 in Section 1. It gathered data on the needs and the benefits of systematically integrating 
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security with DevOps and the impacts that such integration can have on the business of the companies. 
In addition, there were also questions concerned with the company profile, i.e. application domains, 
number of employees, headquarters, and key development processes, to provide the organizational 
contexts of responding companies.
A convenience sampling strategy was adopted due to the difficulties in recruiting company 
subjects. The survey was conducted within the scope of a European research initiative within the 
H2020 Framework Programme. We sent the questionnaire to a group of companies that were involved 
in this initiative. These companies are based in Europe, but many of them are multi-national and have 
businesses across the globe. They are all actively developing CPSs in critical and regulated industry 
sectors. The data collection lasted three months, from January 2017 to March 2017. In total, we have 
received responses from 33 companies. A follow-up communication was performed in April 2017 
to clarify companies’ responses.
The survey responses were first analysed individually and then aggregated for text coding. In 
coding, the key concepts in the responses (i.e., codes) of each main research question were identified. 
A reference from each code to the original responses has also been stored to be used as quotes and 
examples. Codes are then categorized as needs, benefits, and characteristics of a Secure DevOps 
approach as described in the following. The results are first summarized (Sections 4.1-4.3) and then 
illustrated by sector (see Table 1). The Secure DevOps approach we propose is finally derived from 
the characteristics in Table 1 and graphically illustrated in Figure 3. In particular, Table 1 details 
the needs, benefits and characteristics per sector. Codes that are shared among two or more sectors 
are reported only for the sector from which we received more responses. For this reason, the sector 
Data analytics and Big Data (DABD) does not appear in Table 1. Figure 3 illustrates the different 
components of Secure DevOps according to the results of our qualitative analysis.
4. ReSULTS
Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the companies that participated in the survey. As 
shown in Figure 1, these companies are distributed across Europe, spanning from North to South and 
East to West. Figure 2 illustrates the business sectors. The main business domains these companies 
operate in are automotive, aerospace, healthcare, and energy, where CPSs play an increasingly crucial 
role. The surveyed companies are consumers, producers, or consultants of CPS technologies and 
related services.
In the following subsections, we provide answers to the research questions, based on the empirical 
data we have collected. The section is structured as follows. We first present the needs and the benefits 
of integrating security in DevOps and then report the impact of Secure DevOps on the CPSs industry.
4.1. The Needs for Secure devops (RQ1)
4.1.1. Security is Critical for Both Hardware and Software
The survey results demonstrated in a clear manner that the continued convergence of IT and OT 
(Operational Technology) systems, along with expanding connectivity to the Internet, exasperated by 
the growth of the Industrial IoTs, has introduced a larger threat landscape for potential exploitation 
by adversaries. The new generation of embedded systems interconnected via Internet through wired 
or wireless connections is more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, especially in critical domains (Sharma 
et al. 2017). As such, both hardware and software security are critical for existing and new CPSs as 
one respondent operating in the healthcare sector stated:
The security of our solutions, both at the component level, network level and application level are 
of paramount value. Not only is our hardware being used in highly sensitive scenarios, but also they 
are being used to test vulnerabilities in other systems.
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Table 1. Key concerns in integrating security in DevOps and characteristics of secure DevOps per CPSs domain as envisioned 





DevOps-Related Needs and 
Benefits
Security-Related Needs and 
Benefits
Secure DevOps Impact and 
Characteristics
HMT
• Large installed base of 
products be serviced and 
upgraded in short times; 
• Improve the overall 
handling costs while ensuring 
the required safety and 
security needs; 
• Adaptation of the DevOps 
architecture in existing 
models, working instructions
• Data access needs to be 
secure to a high level; 
• Safety and security by 
executing the DevOps actions 
on the equipment; 
• Security-by-design;
• Maintain a well-organized 
development and release cycle 
with satisfactory levels of 
security
• Continuous monitoring and 
delivery for hospital-based 
systems; 
• Devices connected to cloud and 
network services; 
• Multitude of semi-professional 
devices
AE
• Distributed systems 
including multiple software 
and firmware levels must be 
easily reconfigurable in a 
fully distributed fashion
• Integrate security 
considerations from its very 
initial conception; 
• Security of the system, 
the entire set of system 
users while allowing several 
degrees of access privilege; 
• Space systems have to be 
validated against the standards 
• Distributed systems 
including multiple software 
and firmware levels must be 
securely reconfigurable in a 
fully distributed fashion
• Deploying the system, a high 
level of security be maintained 
in a multi-user, multi-connected 
environment; 
• New validation and test 
procedures to guarantee the 
proper performance and security 
of the system in the new com- 
plex environment
AU
• Cloud with telematics 
interfaces, CAN bus; ] 
• Electricity distribution 
network, sub-stations, 
transformation posts and 
other equipment
• Managing security issues 
after the development phase 
is expensive and time-
consuming; 
• Adding cyber security to the 
current service; 
• Security assessment and 
penetration testing; 
• Security problems have an 
impact on the safety; 
• Qualified vendors to 
introduce new and advanced 
cyber security features
• Car technology adoption;




• Car technology adoption; 
Security-by-design, 
automotive market;
• Qualified vendors to 
introduce new and advanced 
cyber security features
• Regulated distribution and 
supply businesses; 
• Transformational process 
regarding Smart Grid security
S
• Hardware, applications, 
own devices; 
• Autonomous pre-
processing of the acquired 
data, communication with 
server/cloud, local storage/
retrieval of the data
• Increased security needs 
arise in application areas; 
• Robustness of systems 
against attacks, digital 
signatures, reliable and 
certified source of sensor in- 
formation
• Implementation of the security 
concepts; 
• Integrate security features in the 
embedded solutions; 
• Application development 
processes (and skills) to the new 
environment
continued on following page
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DevOps-Related Needs and 
Benefits
Security-Related Needs and 
Benefits
Secure DevOps Impact and 
Characteristics
T
• Data from the network to 
enable early and automatic 
detection; 
• Dynamically balance an IT 
network
• Securing the systems 
against cyber threats; 
• Security requirements 
from the initial architecture 
definition
• Complement conventional 
networks with satellite market and 
its technology evolving satellite 
broadband communications
SS
• Reduce the time of the 
testing process
• Combining security as an 
integral part of continuous 
operations; 
• Incorporate safety and 
security in the toolchain; 
• Implement security both as 
part of the normal operation 
and as part of the DevOps 
activity to provide secured 
field upgrades for application 
code, middleware and real-
time operating systems 
• Adopt and adapt guidelines 
al- ready developed in 
other domains (as the ICT 
one OSSTMM, NIST and 
OWASP) for a completely 
connected car
• Adopt product architectures 
that enable safety and security 
compliance; 
• Adopt new processes and 
tools that incorporate safety and 
security in the toolchain; 
• Feed new requirements to 
standards and certification 
bodies; 
• Introduce team-building and 
new roles for security integration;
CSI
• Develop fast and seamless 
Dev- Ops approach without 
having to compromise on 
security aspects 
• Build communities for 
design thinking, DevOps and 
advanced analytics; 
• Integrate customer 
processes, applications, and 
people in service provider 
technology and service 
ecosystem; 
• Reduced cost and improve 
collaboration between 
development and deployment 
teams; 
• Keep up with the needs 
of the new tools and 
technologies to enhance 
DevOps
• Increase and ensure focus 
on security at the service 
design and transition 
processes; 
• Need of personalized 
training and evaluation of 
cybersecurity capabilities 
of both Development and 
Operations Teams 
• Structurally improve 
security of customer 
environment by applying best 
agile development practices 
and requirements; 
• Make the solution 
distinctive when compared to 
other actors in the software 
industry and hence guarantee 
competitiveness; 
• Deepen the co-operation 
with developers, IT, Security 
and Risk Management
• Create a platform to train and 
evaluate trainees for Secure 
DevOps 
• Adopt policies, concepts and 
security mechanism to ensure the 
right level of cybersecurity 
• Integrating development 
process to customer business 
processes, technology and 
continual improvement in order to 
leverage effect; 
• Define and develop solutions 
for remote upgrade of security 
components; 
• Define automatic security 
reporting tools and procedures 
tailored to CPS (different means 
of communications, lower 
processing power etc.); 
• Integrate security safety 
and privacy procedures in 
development IDEs; 
• Develop solutions for predicting 
security downtimes
Table 1. Continued
continued on following page
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4.1.2. Security Concerns Must be Strategically and Systematically 
Incorporated in the Whole System Development Process
For companies developing or using automotive and aerospace software, the respondents sense the urge to 
be proactive and prepared to address these concerns and incorporate them into their software development 
processes. This is particularly relevant for companies that intend to open access of their systems to a 





DevOps-Related Needs and 
Benefits
Security-Related Needs and 
Benefits
Secure DevOps Impact and 
Characteristics
TIoT
• Develop proprietary 
solutions to control and 
monitor integrated ystems
• Define security 
requirements 
• Implement continuous real-
time risk management and 
scalable security measures 
by established PDCA-cycles 
in threat modeling (STRIDE 
method) during the whole 
CPSs lifecycle; 
• Reduce costs and time by 
avoiding implementation 
bugs and architectural flaws 
due to the integrated risk 
management and security 
view during the whole CPSs 
lifecycle; 
• Co-operation between the 
CPSs- design and security 
experts during the whole 
lifecycle
• Optimize a comprehensive 
threat mod- eling and scalable 
security measures to CPSs-
specifics 
• Adapt and create new toolsets 
(e.g. for an automatically threat 
modeling process and improved 
risk managment); 
• Integrate cryptographic 
schemes and intrusion detection 
system in DevOps
Note: Duplicate concerns and characteristics among sectors have not been reported. 
DADB is not reported as no specific information.
Table 1. Continued
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of the surveyed companies
International Journal of Systems and Software Security and Protection
Volume 11 • Issue 2 • July-December 2020
46
DevOps-driven services rely on automation, virtualization and smart tool choices, which require 
security aspects to be included in the DevOps pipeline.
As by now, companies need a more thorough strategy for security integration involving the 
entirety of their system development:
In the current [solutions], the security is often limited to data security or to the middle-ware as 
isolated pieces. Securing the whole system remains a project-by-project specific task requiring 
specialized know-how.
4.1.3. Security Must be Integrated by Design at the Earliest 
Phases of Development in a Semi-Automated Manner
There is the need to improve security features with an integrated approach that covers all 
development and validation phases of a product in a simple, fast and flexible way. Therefore, 
security must be integrated by design: security must be considered and handled from the beginning 
of system development in a systematic and holistic way. A service provider in the healthcare sector 
further suggests:
It is fundamental that we apply the same security by design methodology and put it to the test, to 
every system we develop to ensure that our solutions can be easy yet very securely, re-configurable 
in a fully distributed fashion.
The integration of security in development processes must follow the modern development 
practice where automation is essential (Casola, De Benedictis, Rak, & Villano, 2019 Casola, De 
Benedictis, Rak & Villano, 2020). Of course, as any human-centric activity in development, full 
automation is not conceivable. A semi-automated approach where security specifications are designed 
by developers and checks of such specifications are automated is the most viable solution today:
As companies become bit by bit more aware of the relevance and importance of security during 
the development of their products, we have seen a slow but steady move from performing security-
related activities late in the development life-cycle (for example penetration testing before release) 
to earlier phases of the life-cycle (for example secure code reviews). However, there is a long way 
to go - understanding how development and security-related activities can be combined in a semi-
automated way.
4.1.4. Balancing Between Speed and Security
The increase of security concerns and certification, however, does not overshadow the need for speed 
and agility. That is why the DevOps approach is appealing to many companies. The typical example 
Figure 2. Distribution of business sectors of the surveyed companies (some companies are in multiple sectors)
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is the aerospace sector. The respondents from this sector reported that development activities could 
account from 35% up to 80% of product development cost once certification is included. The cost 
would further increase with re-certification that also slows down implementation and maintenance 
activities. A new, more flexible process is essential. As such, companies in our sample see DevOps 
as an opportunity to boost innovation and increase the agility of their development processes and 
Secure DevOps cannot invalidate such benefits.
Currently, security and DevOps are two parallel worlds and due to a lack of supporting tools, 
security requirements are handled manually rather than automatically. In this setting, integrating 
speed and agility with security requirements imposes a big burden on companies that might not be 
able to satisfy all their needs in security while adopting DevOps:
It is a significant burden to maintain a well-organized development and release cycle with satisfactory 
levels of security in the released products while at the same time being able to respond to customer 
requests for new features.
4.1.5. Teams must be Trained for Secure DevOps
There is a lack of a comprehensive approach for the competencies that are related to cyber-security. 
There is a need to develop events like “cyber security capture the flag” that put together security 
professionals and/or students learning about cyber-security, which can be an opportunity since they 
can be applied in various social environments and audiences:
A competency framework with a holistic approach including technical and non-technical skills such 
as team collaboration and time responsiveness, but also psychological and pedagogical competences.
4.2. expected Benefits and Characteristics of Secure devops (RQ2)
4.2.1. Secure DevOps Involves the Whole CPS Lifecycle
According to Table 1, applying Secure DevOps would impact on the whole lifecycle of CPSs 
development processes by extending the security coverage to all phases, including system development, 
device deployment and provisioning, standard operations, maintenance, and system dismissing. By 
adopting Secure DevOps, most surveyed companies expect to achieve faster, more cost-effective, and 
more efficient development and maintenance of secure CPSs and be able to provide more frequent and 
safe updates to software, under a wide range of circumstances with increased reliability of the process.
4.2.2. Secure DevOps Eases the Certification Process
For those companies that are constrained by regulations, they also expect that certification processes 
are carried out more quickly and evidence needed for certification are gathered more easily, should 
the Secure DevOps approach be adopted. It also implies that proactive actions could be taken based 
on the collected evidence to ensure:
forthcoming regulatory changes and evolution by being a forerunner in regulatory advisory process.
They also foresee:
reduced costs and pain associated with certified mission-critical software development.
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4.2.3. Secure DevOps Speeds Up Continuous Deployment
A closer collaboration between software development and operation teams promoted by the Secure 
DevOps approach enables us to deploy features into production quickly and to detect and correct 
problems when they occur, without disrupting other services. The development, deployment and 
testing processes are accelerated for updates and can be easily monitored. Additional benefits are 
improved tooling and system support for collaboration and security-centered development. As a 
service provider company specialized in data analytics and big data explains:
in our view, we are not only moving security earlier in the development cycle but also ensuring 
that at operation time the security aspects of the application are being kept, by monitoring 
anomalies and applying the appropriate countermeasures, either automatically when feasible, 
or with human intervention.
4.2.4. Secure DevOps is Inherently an Agile Process
Quite a few surveyed companies expect similar benefits from Secure DevOps as from agile methods, 
including better iteration management and sustainable pace in system development through regular 
iterations. The companies constrained by heavy regulations are also keen to experiment with Secure 
DevOps to better understand how to adopt agile methods effectively. Adopting a Secure DevOps approach 
could boost agile and continuous development in companies ensuring the same level of security.
4.2.5. Secure DevOps Increases the Overall Quality of Services, Products, and Processes
From the perspective of products / services, the surveyed companies expect to produce comprehensive 
and flexible, constantly evolving services with fused security and obtain significant quality 
improvements in many measures: functionality, extensibility, defect rates. The product is expected 
to be scalable in terms of implementing new technologies into the already installed systems, and 
comply to existing and upcoming standards for CPSs. A service provider company foresees that a 
Secure DevOps approach can:
support its customers in the stages of their cloud application development process: continuous 
architecting, development, deployment as well as continuous improvement during the exploitation 
and operation phase of secured CPS applications.
4.2.6. Secure DevOps Decreases Cost
Reduced cost and time of development, operation and maintenance are also expected, since 
implementation bugs and architectural flaws will be reduced due to the integrated risk management 
and security view during the whole CPS lifecycle. A surveyed company underlined that:
a realistic estimate is that both of these efforts can be reduced by 10% as a result of the improved 
security technology for both development and operations.
4.2.7. Secure DevOps’ Effects go Beyond an Individual CPS’s Development
A Secure DevOps approach can have greater influence that goes beyond the scope of CPSs products 
and processes, and produce real business value. The surveyed companies see a great opportunity in 
a Secure DevOps approach to CPSs to drive price competitiveness through automation, optimized 
cost structure in a revolutionary way. The improved quality of service (better security and hence 
stability) at a more competitive cost will enhance the competitive advantages of the companies in 
the CPS market, and enable a significant increase in the business volume and the range of services 
offered to the market. As one surveyed company puts it:
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Security within the organization is seen as a business enabler. As such we see a driving need to ensure 
our solutions meet and exceed the needs of the market with security.
The ability to address security effectively, enabled by a Secure DevOps approach, brings cutting-
edge competitive advantages to the companies and their customers as well. As a service provider in 
the healthcare sector responds:
to us, a source of competitiveness is the high level of security shown by our solutions, both at the 
component level, network level and application level.
One surveyed company, an embedded system manufacturer that oriented its core business in the 
last ten years in the areas of CPSs and industrial IoT, reports that Secure DevOps has the potential to:
demolish the barriers that characterize today the acceptance of IoT solutions.
A Secure DevOps approach requires a close collaboration among CPS-design experts, software 
development and operation teams, and security experts during the whole lifecycle. Secure DevOps is:
a security-enhanced DevOps platform with an end-to-end security mindset between different functions 
inside the company.
This increases employees’ ability to work in multidisciplinary teams and, in turn, pushes 
team members to be creative and innovative. Thus, Secure DevOps can cause a change of internal 
organizational culture.
4.3. Industry Impacts of Secure devops (RQ3)
As we mentioned, implementing Secure DevOps produces impacts that go beyond a company’s internal 
assets. Increase innovation, strengthen market position, ensure competitive advantage and create new 
business opportunities are the major impacts that motivate the European industry.
Increasing the innovation capacity of companies helps maintain their reputation and ensures 
their sustainability. For the surveyed consultancy companies, being the forefront of innovation helps 
consolidate their internal research and development line and their role as experts in the field. More in 
general, innovation is a means to strengthen the market position and create a competitive advantage 
for companies operating in the technological sector. Integrating security in DevOps further creates 
leadership of such companies in a market dominated by the provision and consumption of IoT services 
and concerns on cyber-security. Companies consider a secure IoT infrastructure capable of reducing 
barriers that characterize the acceptance of IoT solutions.
Integrating security-by-design in the development of solutions that can be distributed across 
architectures and locations over the Internet enables the companies to target new types of customers, 
growing their client base, and be distinctive in the IT market. Safe and stable products or infrastructures 
provide new market opportunities, increase service portfolio (e.g., security coaching with DevOps) 
or business sector coverage (e.g., the Smart Home field), as one surveyed company puts it:
enter new business segments or markets where today we have no footprints yet.
Finally, the sole DevOps paradigm opens up a new form of cooperation with customers who, in 
turn, get a long-lasting competitive edge.
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In summary, some of the findings of this work are well-known problems with DevOps and 
security. The new concepts we gathered from the survey are related to whole life-cycle management, 
security-by-design, tool-chain integration, and people training and roles. Many companies seem to be 
struggling with adapting their current processes and development environments for the new security 
requirements of more complex CPSs.
5. dISCUSSIoN
CPSs are becoming more and more commonplace. This poses new needs and opportunities for 
innovation both in product and service solution companies, including consultant companies. However, 
the complexity of CPSs tends to be increasing, which is a particular challenge considering their 
stringent security and compliance requirements. While the basic DevOps approach supports the new 
product development needs of fast innovation and continuous evolution, the domain-specific security 
constraints and certifications are still a challenge. Thus, the industrial needs and expectations for 
Secure DevOps have significant managerial as well as research implications.
Based on the answers to our research questions, especially the characteristics of Secure DevOps 
we derived from them, in this section, we discuss our envisioned approach.
5.1. enabling Secure devops
Overall, based on our survey findings, we can suggest the following aggregated areas for improvement 
actions in response to industrial needs and to advance the current state of the art in order to successfully 
apply DevOps for secure, resilient CPSs’ development:
• Understanding of Business and Regulatory Needs: It is necessary to define the critical 
requirements and constraints on the technological, process, and organizational improvements 
that enable secure continuous deployment in CPSs settings, such as safety and security, and 
regulatory inhibitors and facilitators. These requirements should be derived through a business 
value-driven analysis of the business needs and use cases of companies, taking into account their 
specific CPSs domain characteristics and future development trajectories;
• Security-Enabling/Enabled DevOps Processes: New or adapted processes to support Secure 
DevOps in the context of CPSs are needed to perform continuous security deployment (i.e., 
continuous deployment to address security concerns), and their relationship / seamless integration 
with already existing (agile) development processes inside companies. These processes cover 
not only methodological and technical aspects but also the organizational culture of the 
development, including, for instance, team compositions, roles and responsibilities, and even 
taking multi-organizational ecosystem development into account (e.g., component vendors and 
service partners);
• Architecture and Technologies for Secure DevOps: Revising existing and introducing new 
architectures and technologies is necessary to develop CPSs products in a DevOps manner, where 
security is an integral part of the development process and product throughout the development 
and deployment cycle. Such technologies and architectures act as a reference for building safe 
and secure CPSs. In addition, since monitoring of the deployed systems is a key concept of 
DevOps, also the feedback loop from actual use to the development shall be considered both 
at conceptual and technological level (e.g., integrated into development platforms) to fit the 
regulatory aspects of the development;
• Supporting Tools and Infrastructure: Concrete tooling and infrastructure (e.g., development 
platforms) are indispensable to develop, ship, and operate CPSs in a secure manner using 
DevOps, and enabling the deployment and operation pipelines. Such tooling and infrastructure 
must support key DevOps concepts such as continuous delivery monitoring of system operations 
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with end-to-end visibility of security, and enrich them with CPSs concerns such as a plurality 
of operational environment software and hardware platforms, and certification;
• People/Organizational Development: It is not straightforward to make the DevOps approach 
work fully effectively in industrial software organizations. In CPSs domains, this is further 
complicated by the many complexities inherent in such software-intensive systems. Moreover, 
the security requirements must be adhered to at all times and in all related activities. It 
follows that the Secure DevOps approach should be designed and fabricated into the entire 
software organization in comprehensive and capability-based ways. Basic DevOps must be 
augmented with industry-strength systems engineering and management capabilities coupled 
with organization-wide security awareness. The key competencies and mindsets must be 
developed and fostered accordingly.
5.2. The Secure devops Approach
Figure 3 illustrates the Secure DevOps approach we envisioned based on the findings we discussed 
in the previous section. It is shown how the above-mentioned main elements work together for secure 
construction and updating of CPSs. The essence is that Secure DevOps contributes to deliver and 
maintain compliant and competitive CPSs in operation. In addition, it exhibits how the business 
demands for fast new product development can be supported. Continuous feedback for both security 
and functionality is essential. In summary, the Secure DevOps approach would support the following:
• Continuous identification of business/regulatory requirements;
• Continuous monitoring of emerging security threats;
• Coordinating the collaboration between Security and DevOps personnel with other stakeholders.
Arguably, it requires strategic organization design and major developmental efforts to realize all 
the components in Figure 3 in real industrial companies. Many modern CPSs domains – especially 
in Industry 4.0 – are currently under rapid technological advancements (e.g., automotive), but at the 
same time, their security concerns and regulatory requirements become more stringent (e.g., Smart 
Grids). Consequently, more extensive theoretical principles and methods are needed (e.g., systems 
Figure 3. Secure DevOps: Developing, shipping and operating competitive CPSs in a secure manner with DevOps
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modelling of heterogeneous cyber and physical components). Modern Industry 4.0 smart factories 
and manufacturing systems, smart grids, smart vehicles, and smart health environments are complex 
CPS constellations with multiple connections and accesses. Dependable and secure architectures by 
design and secure management and governance of operational services and systems must be realized. 
Our envisioned Secure DevOps approach embraces such research challenges.
A Secure DevOps approach coordinates various elements of CPSs development, including 
people, organization, process, business, and infrastructure, as seen in Figure 3. These elements are 
generally described so that they can fit into the different contexts of application. We do not focus on 
specializing the process for one application domain. Hence, not many relationship links are shown 
in Figure 3. The framework should be seen as a collection of necessary elements to build a Secure 
DevOps process for the modern CPS project.
5.3. Threats to Validity
Like any other empirical study, we also faced some validity threats. We were aware that information collected 
from the survey participants might tend to subjective perception. We had initiatives to reduce the bias as 
much as possible, i.e. following-up interviews, brainstorming, and several meetings among key participants. 
Much internal communication in participating organizations occurred to make sure the information truly 
reflects the actual situations in organizations. Given the fact that participation is a part of a larger research 
initiative, the participants had nothing to gain by giving false information. Furthermore, focusing on one 
data source for each case also allows us to inquire further and analyze specific contexts (Dybå, 2013).
Regarding data analysis, we documented and stored all feedback from the participants. The 
documentation enabled us to track changes, which allowed us to keep track of updated information. 
This allows replication of the analysis by others. We also made the set of data and the analyzed 
spreadsheet available to all the research participants for correction if needed.
Regarding external validity, a qualitative survey does not aim at quantitative generalization 
but characterizing the research topics in their contexts. In this work, our cases are from various 
industry domains, with diverse company sizes. The findings from our survey shape the perspective 
for companies active in the CPSs’ business. Another potential threat to external validity is that the 
surveyed companies are all from Europe, even though they have a global presence. The generalizability 
of the findings to companies in other geographic locations is subject to validation.
6. CoNCLUSIoN
In this paper, we have investigated both conceptually and empirically what secure, competitive CPSs 
development and operation entail. Based on the industrial survey data, we have identified practitioners’ 
needs for that. Accordingly, we have envisioned and characterized a Secure DevOps approach. We 
see a lot of promise in the field of high-performing development and delivery of resilient, secure 
CPSs. However, there is a wide gap in research, calling for more attention in the following research 
and developmental areas:
1.  Holistic, domain-specific deep understanding of what CPSs and their software development 
needs are;
2.  Following that, systematic comprehension of what safety and security entails in them, including 
specific regulations associated with different CPS domains;
3.  Based on such foundations, well-justified suggestions regarding how DevOps would support 
their secure (software) development.
The key characteristic is that modern CPSs in such use environments as Industry 4.0 are 
increasingly interconnected software-intensive systems. Hence, for instance, IoT platform providers 
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could serve multiple CPS business domains and consequently support security features in general, 
rather than satisfying domain-specific requirements. Therefore, based on our industrial survey, we 
propose future research and development:
• To improve the capability of industrial ecosystems to enable development, deployment, and 
delivery of new and innovative cyber-physical products and services;
• To enable the industry to develop secure, safe, and reliable CPSs based on sound design guidelines 
and toolchains that satisfy regulatory needs, based on the ability to adapt, tailor, and scale 
processes that facilitate DevOps adoption in critical domains;
• To enable and empower industry by overcoming organizational barriers and challenges that 
inhibit the effective adoption of DevOps;
• To revise the suggested approach to include domain-specific elements for specific CPS domains 
such as medical devices, transportation systems or smart grids.
Multidisciplinary development and systematic improvements are needed to achieve these goals, 
as the needs proposed by standardization and other regulatory authorities exceed any boundaries of 
technology, processes, and industry domains and practices.
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